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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Our research question is whether the European financial crisis has determined the 
changes made to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2013. This is an important 
question for EU analysts in general and CAP specialists in particular as its answer may 
help to improve our knowledge on CAP dynamics.  
 
There is an ongoing debate on which are the determinants of CAP reform. Research has 
been carried out on the possible connection between CAP reform and six main factors: 
the EU budget, enlargement, paradigm shifts, the institutional setting, previous CAP 
reforms and international pressure (whether multilateral, regional or bilateral). In other 
words, the economic environment has not been contemplated as a direct determinant of 
CAP reform but its proxy, the budget, has not only been looked at as such but 
underlined as a key cause of CAP reform. It is indeed generally assumed that the budget 
will reflect the economic environment by being more austere in times of economic 
crisis.  
 
In the area of our particular policy, there is a clear budgetary trend. Since the 1980s 
there has been a conscious effort to limit the weight of the CAP in the general budget, at 
least in relative terms. As a result several financial constraints to the CAP budget 
growth have been agreed upon over the years. For both the 1988-92 and 1993-99 
budgetary periods, the so-called Agriculture Guideline limited ‘guarantee’ expenditure 
growth to 74% of the rate of growth of the EU’s GDP. A system of stabilizers triggering 
automatic cuts in support prices if certain production thresholds were breeched ensured 
the respect of the Guideline throughout those years. The Financial Perspective for 2000-
2006 left for the first time the overall ceiling on the EU budget unchanged, enlargement 
notwithstanding, and maintained the CAP Guideline. In 2002 an agreement was reached 
regarding the 2007-2013 Financial Framework that introduced a Financial Discipline 
Mechanism. The CAP expenditure for market support and direct payments would 
remain constant on the 2006 levels and a maximum yearly increased of one percent 
would be allowed. Direct payments to farmers would be reduced if the annual 
agricultural budget ceiling was exceeded. This limitation to CAP expenditure was 
confirmed both in 2005, when the 2007-13 MFF was actually agreed upon, and in the 
2007-08 full ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending and resources. So far 
there has been no need to invoke the Financial Discipline as among other factors the 
world market prices for agricultural commodities have been higher than expected.  
 
These agreements have ensured a decrease in relative terms of the CAP budget for  
market-related expenditure and direct payments. The relative weight has gone from a 
peak of 86.9% in 1970 to less than 35% en 2013.  Despite this trend, as figure 1 shows, 
in absolute terms resources increased till 2007 and the reduction pattern since then has 
been very small. CAP total expenses still represent over 40% of the general budget and 
therefore still are a key issue in EU budgetary negotiations.  
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Figure 1. CAP budgetary evolution 
 
(EAGGF Guarantee Section or market-related expenditure and direct payments; From 
1961 to 1977 in million UA; from 1978 until 1998 in million ECU; from 1999 onwards 
in million Euros) 
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Conclusions of the European Council 7/8 February 2013 for the Multiannual Financial 
Framework 2014-2020 
 
On the account of these two facts: the effort to limit the CAP weight in the budget and 
the crisis general constraint upon EU finances, one would expect the crisis to have a 
negative impact on CAP expenses. Indeed, the European Council agreement in February 
18 (EUCO 37/13) on the 2014-20 multilateral framework, approved by the European 
Parliament in November, indicates that EU member states have not been prepared to 
accept the Commission proposal regarding either the general budget nor the agricultural 
expenses. More austerity has been asked for.  
 
On these bases, the linear causality would be the following: The crisis has an impact on 
the general budget making it more austere. More austerity in the EU financial 
framework means more austerity in CAP expenses. In turn that means budgetary 
pressure for CAP reform so that the 2013 changes are the result of the negative 
economic environment.  
 
Is this line of causality true? How can we ascertain that?  
 
In principle this line of causality is the result of what previous research tells us on the 
budgetary impact on CAP reform. Nevertheless, previous research has never tried to 
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measure the impact of budgetary pressures on CAP reform. The method has been to 
look for evidence of budgetary constraints and to logically deduce that these restrictions 
would affect the CAP. This was especially true in the 1980s and 1990s when agriculture 
expenses were considered to be out of control. Yet from 1988 onwards budgetary 
discipline has been introduced in all financial frameworks so as to prevent a spiral of 
expenses, i.e. to limit the growth of agricultural expenses. Nowadays nobody (not even 
the French) is expecting an increase in the weight of agriculture in the EU budget, on 
the contrary, we all expect a decrease in the relative financial importance of the CAP. 
The bets are on the speed of the decrease. Swinbank (2012) has even recently argued 
that the Eurozone crisis may have helped prevent a larger trimming of the CAP’s budget 
so as to preserve the redistributive effects of CAP among Member States and in 
particular among the four Eurozone countries most badly affected by the crisis.  
 
Another doubt regarding this line of causality arises from the fact that each CAP reform 
studied so far has also been attributed not only to budgetary pressures but also to other 
internal factors as well as to international pressure. Yet if the reform of the CAP 
answers to other determinants apart from budgetary constraints, these pressures may not 
be demanding the same type of reform. In fact, budgetary constraints may have meant 
that the CAP could not longer remain the same yet the reforms introduced in 1992 and 
2003 both supposed an increase in absolute terms of CAP expenses. Both in 1992 and 
2003, the reform meant that the CAP was no longer to be financed in part by price 
support, that is, by consumers, but that the EU budget would have to carry the full 
burden of the assistance through direct payments. In fact, as Swinbank (2012) points out 
some price support reduction was postponed to 2005-2006 so as to bringing the 
expected expenditure on the CAP back within the financing package.  
 
We believe that the answer to this conundrum is that each of these determinants has an 
impact on different aspects of CAP reform. Our hypothesis is that the budget does not 
affect the modus operandi of the CAP. It affects the timing of the reform and the 
quantity of support each farmer is going to get but not the form it is going to receive it. 
Other CAP determinants and international negotiations in particular, have an impact on 
the substance and timing of CAP reform. On the basis of this hypothesis, the 2013 CAP 
review would have taken place without the crisis. The crisis will have an impact on the 
amount of money the farmers will receive but not in the way the CAP works. If this is 
true then the CAP 2013 changes should be explained by other factors.  
 
2.  CAP REFORM DETERMINANTS: A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 
 
Analysts agree that the CAP has greatly changed since the 1960s despite the fact that its 
objectives continue to be those set out in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome. The policy 
change has been brought up through changes in its instruments. As Haniotis (2006: 55) 
summarizes it:  ‘In the early 1990s, market measures related to support of agricultural 
products accounted for 91 percent of the agricultural budget of the EU. By 2000, the 
product support had declined to 21 percent and by 2007, the year of the full 
implementation of the 2003 reform, this figure dropped to 10 percent.’ Figure 2 
graphically shows this instrumental change from market support (or forms of indirect 
support through prices and export subsidies) to direct payments (coupled or decoupled) 
and rural development support. 
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Figure 2. CAP instrumental change since the 1980s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2011) 
 
     
 
If we consider that policy reform implies at least a change in the policy instruments that 
operate across the sector as a whole (or most parts of it),1 the CAP has so far gone 
through only two reforms: the MacSharry Reform in 1992 and the Fischler Reform in 
2003 (Grant, 2010). The 1988 and 1999 revisions and the so-called Health Check in 
2008 cannot be considered real reforms as they did not changed the policy instruments. 
What these revisions did was to adjust the policy instruments or/and finish to implement 
the previous reform. As table 1 summarizes (see at the end of the article), till the 
McSharry reform, the CAP was a commodity support policy based on threshold prices. 
With the 1992 reform it started to shift towards a farmer support policy through 
switching from indirect support (through prices) to direct payments. The Fischler 
reform fully endorsed the shift by introducing decoupling. The Agenda 2000 CAP 
revision was ‘cast in the MacSharry mould’ (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2007: 8) and the 
Health Check was a deepening of the Fischler reform. 
 
Table 2. Single and Comparative CAP reform studies 
 
 
determinants Single reform studies Comparative reforms studies 
                                                 
1
 Other definitions of CAP reform have been put forward. For example, Lynnggaard and Nedergaard 
(2009: 294) consider that ‘in order to accept an observation within the CAP as a policy reform, it needs to 
have actual effects on the CAP budget and/Or the distribution of financial resources among the involved 
agents.’ 
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enlargement Henning and Latcz-Lohmann 
(2004) enlargement 2004 
 
Henning (2008) Enlargement 
2004 and 2007 
Cunha(2004) 2003 reform 
Lovec and Erjavec (2013) 
budget pressure  Ackrill et al (2008) -> reforms 
1980s till 2003 
international pressure Swinbank and Tranter (2004) -> 
1992 reform 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2011) 
-> Health Check 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2007) 
-> reforms 1992-1999-2003 
Ackrill et al (2008) -> reforms 
1980s till 2003 
 
path dependency  Daugbjerg (2009) -> how 
reactive sequencing may help 
explain CAP reforms 
Kay (2003) -> path dependency 
constraint more than determinant 
ideas  Lynggaard and Nedergaard 
(2009)  -> reforms between 1980 
and 2003 
Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2009) 
-> reforms 1992-1999-2003. 
institutional setting Haniotis (2006) -> 2003 reform Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2007) 
-> reforms 1992-1999-2003 
all   Garzon (2006): reforms till 
2003. 
 
 
 
There have been both single reform and comparative reform studies that have tried to 
pinpoint which are the determinants of CAP revisions -Table 2 offers a classification of 
our literature review on that bases. Research so far has brought evidence that these 
determinants can be both internal and external in nature and that, since the 1990s, 
international pressure has been particularly important. There is no general consensus 
however on which are the internal factors or as to which is the most important among 
them in terms of impact on the CAP reviews. Even Commission officials and 
government representatives involved in the discussions have different positions on the 
issue (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2009; Cunha and Swinbank, 2009). To take the words 
of Kay (2003: 408): ‘There is no well-developed, high content theory in the current 
literature on the development of the CAP.’ By reviewing the secondary literature, it is 
nevertheless possible to reach some conclusions regarding the nature of each of the 
main CAP determinants.   
 
International pressure: there is a consensus among both academia and practitioners 
that CAP reforms have been influenced by multilateral trade Round of negotiations, that 
is by external pressure (by the interests of non-EU export countries but also by the 
interests of non-agricultural EU sectors). (Some have even argued that bilateral and 
regional negotiations with third countries may have an impact of CAP reform). 
Daugbjerg (2009) for example explains how with the 2003 reform, and specifically with 
the decoupling of the area and headage payments from production, the EU intended to 
switch direct payments from the WTO blue box into the green box so as to be exempted 
from reductions commitments. Henning and Latacz-Lohmann (2004) argue that there is 
a gridlock in the Council of Ministers of Agriculture in favour of the status-quo and that 
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external shocks such as further WTO restrictions serve to mitigate extreme positions 
and to break up the gridlock. From this point of view, international pressure would be 
the main cause of CAP reforms because it is a force capable of changing its policy 
instruments. This international pressure started with the Uruguay Round. As Daugbjerg 
and Swinbank (2009: 316) put it: ‘Prior to the URAA, the GATT played only a minor 
role in shaping the CAP.’ Nevertheless, there is some debate on the extent external 
factors can explain all aspects of CAP reform. Lovec and Erjavec (2013), among others,  
argue that EU has engaged in unilateral changes, that is, reforms that were not 
specifically linked to trade concessions. In any case, the research method used to 
establish the importance of international pressures in CAP reform has invariably been to 
prove that the reforms allowed the CAP to comply with third country demands. 
 
 
Budget pressure: there is also a consensus regarding the existence of a causality link 
between financial constraints and CAP reform. The main research method has been to 
find evidence of budgetary constraints and to logically deduce that these restrictions 
affected the CAP. Kay (2003: 416-17) argues that the budget stabilizer reform of 1988 
laid the seeds for the 1992 CAP reform because it implied an 11 per cent cut in effective 
support prices and this was politically too much for the farm ministers.  Ackrill (2005) 
and Kay (2006) show that the distribution of costs and benefits of the CAP among EU 
member states has remained stable throughout the history of CAP despite substantial 
reforms.2 By so doing they show that ‘the desire to avoid major budgetary redistribution 
among member states is an important constraint in the evolution of the CAP’ 
(Daugbjerg, 2009: 397). Yet one can also argue that these studies only pinpoint to the 
fact that, except in 1980s,3 the budget has been a reform constraint but not a trigger for 
policy instruments changes. Moreover they also indicate that the budget has not been a 
substance determinant: ‘the design of the CAP changed substantially over a decade 
despite the maintenance of a stable budgetary balance among member states’ 
(Daugbjerg, 2009: 397)  
 
Burrell (2009) has argued that budget pressures may affect the substance of CAP 
through forcing a renationalisation of the policy. Yet though the ‘renationalisation of the 
CAP’ has been discussed and promoted over the last twenty years, even recently by the 
Sapir Report of 2003, the responsibility for agricultural policy funding remains 
engrained into the EU budget. Co-financing has just been introduced in the realm of the 
second pillar. This evidences that budget pressures have not been as intense as in the 
1980s. In this line, Burrell (2009: 285) argues that ‘There is no precedent for even a 
partial EU withdrawal from a major policy area, such a farm income support…If it 
occurs, it will be the result of a comprehensive top-level review and realignment of all 
EU-level activities rather than a unilateral decision by EU agriculture ministers.’ This 
top-level realignment has not yet taken place and therefore the budget has yet to have an 
impact on the substance of CAP policy.  
 
                                                 
2
 As Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2011: 128) argue: ‘Incentives to reform policy may arise as a result of a 
budgetary crisis, particularly with respect to redistributive policies because of a constrained budget, as 
different interest groups compete for a limited pot of taxpayers’ cash.’ 
 
3
 As Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2011: 127) put it: ‘Until the late 1980s there was little doubt among CAP 
analysts that budgetary concern was the major driving force capable of generating CAP reform.’ 
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Enlargement pressure: EU enlargement is considered to be a determinant of CAP 
reform but not a sufficient condition. The main research method has been to establish 
the impact of enlargement on structural changes in the agricultural sector. The debate 
regarding enlargement role as a determinant of CAP reform is on whether enlargement 
fosters CAP changes or make them more difficult. Some analysts have indeed argued 
that enlargements have made CAP reform more difficult. Jensen et al (2009) show that 
EU enlargements have, for their most part (p 332: ‘The 1973 and 1995 enlargements 
were rather neutral or with a tendency to do the opposite’), extensified agricultural 
production at EU level and that extensive agricultural production in a member state is 
often an indicator of reduced willingness to reform. In this sense, Henning and Latacz-
Lohmann (2004) argue that the 2004 enlargement has made the Council more 
heterogeneous in terms of the political interests represented and more supportive of 
higher levels of agricultural support. In their view, (p 42) ‘enlargement, at most, poses a 
further obstacle to reform…’  
 
Other authors have highlighted that enlargement may also be a CAP reform promoter. 
Henning (2008: 41) contends that ‘enlargement might be a driver of CAP reforms ex 
ante the EU’s expansion, while it is an obstacle to future reforms ex post’. Cunha (2004: 
155) endorses this view by arguing that the 2003 reform can in part be explained by the 
‘simplification challenge imposed by [the expected 2004] enlargement’. Lovec and 
Erjavec (2013) have nevertheless recently sustained that enlargements may have an ex-
post driver impact on CAP reform. In particular, they argue that the 2004 enlargement 
through changing the constellation of the production structures explains the increasing 
flexibility of payments schemes.  
 
Last but not least, enlargement has also been seen as enhancing the CAP budgetary 
constraint (Cunha, 2004). As Grant (2010: 34) explains: ‘The CAP has been below 
Budget in the recent past [due to high international prices], but it is anticipated that 
Single Farm Payments will be cut by 7 per cent a year by 2013 under the Financial 
Discipline Mechanism [in force since 2007]. This will result from the continuing 
phasing in of direct aids in the new member states while the addition of Bulgaria and 
Romania has taken the SPS payment budget beyond the Pillar 1 budget ceiling.’ In other 
words, as the CAP budget growth has been limited since the 1980s through different 
stability mechanisms, enlargements cannot be financed through budgetary increases.   
 
The path dependency perspective, as a self-reinforcing force or as a reactive 
sequence, has also been sought to understand the causes of CAP reform. Path-
dependency, which is a key element of historical institutionalism, suggests that ‘present 
structure, or functioning, can only be understood when embedded in a historical 
perspective’ (Daugbjerg, 2009: 395); previous reforms set the direction for future 
reforms due to large fixed costs, potential network effects, potential learning effects and 
adaptative expectations (Kay, 2003). This type of analysis has shown that there are links 
between CAP reforms. The main research method has been to look at the existence of 
possible connections between reform changes over time. 
 
For instance; Kay (2003) argues that path dependency provides an account of why the 
1980s CAP reforms were moderate: ‘the initial policy structure of the CAP [had] 
become entrenched and resistant to reform’. Daugbjerg (2009) shows how reactive 
sequencing from the MacSharry reform enabled further reform of the CAP, eventually 
resulting in the 2003 reform due to the need to simplify the CAP administrative 
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procedures and burdens. In the same line, Grant (2010) argues that the social and 
economic efficacy of instruments and the drive to simplify the policy instruments have 
been major sources of policy change since the 1980s. Garzon (2006: 51) considers that 
‘all reforms since 1992 have tried to address the market imbalances created by the 
original policy instruments based on price support.’ 
 
Nevertheless, it has also been acknowledge that this type of historical analysis does not 
allow predicting further reform. As Daugbjerg (2009) put it: ‘the weakness of the 
reactive sequencing approach is it limited potential to generate theoretical statements on 
sequences’ (p 407) and the limit of the self-reinforcing approach is that it ‘has limited 
potential in explaining substantial policy change over time’ (p 396).  One may conclude 
from the review of the literature on path dependency analysis of CAP reforms that what 
has happened in previous reforms is an input for future reforms (it should be taken into 
account to understand the substance of the reforms) but not a trigger (it does not explain 
why reforms take place) What has happened before limits the number of choices the 
policy-makers will consider when faced with the need for reform, facilitating certain 
policy responses and precluding others. Past CAP reforms experience and consequences 
help decision-makers to choose among different policy options to face other pressures. 
As Daugbjerg put it (2009: 407) ‘the internal dynamics of CAP evolution made certain 
responses to the [external] pressures more likely than others.’ 
 
 
The institutional setting: There is also literature on the role the different actors of the 
EU institutional setting have played in the different reforms. Most of this literature 
concludes that the European Commission has played a key role in the reforms: ‘farm 
commissioners, assisted by top commission officials, have been the driving forces 
behind the CAP reforms…In the history of CAP reform, the Council, as a whole, has 
been status quo minded and, thus, not a driving force behind reform; rather it has been 
an obstacle for farm commissioners to overcome.’ (Daugbjerg, 2009: 399). As 
Lynggaard and Nedergaard (2009: 294) put it: ‘The Commission is usually seen as the 
agent of policy reform within the CAP…However, the latitude of the Commission to 
bring about change is limited.’ Nevertheless, the institutional setting has mostly been 
looked upon to understand the EU internal process leading towards CAP reform rather 
than as a factor that explains why reform took place (Garzon, 2006). The main research 
method has been to assess the institutional setting from a viewpoint of decision-making 
influence. The institutional setting would be what determines how the EU answers and 
reconciles internal and external pressures. In this sense, Haniotis (2006) sustains that 
policy responses in the EU and the US to similar challenges in the agricultural field are 
quite different due to their different institutional settings.4   
  
The five previous determinants may be considered part of theoretical frameworks which 
focus on rationalist assumptions. CAP reform would be the result of a bargaining 
process between individual and collective agents (both internal to the EU and external 
such as the WTO); even the path-dependency determinant could be argued to be part of 
rationalistic historical institutional perspective (Lynggaard and Nedergaard 2009). This 
general approach to CAP reform has been complemented in the last years with new 
                                                 
4
 It is interesting to note that analysts agree that farm organisations have become less powerful in the 
process. Grant (2010: 36) argues that the terrain ‘has been occupied by environmental, third world and 
consumer organizations.’ 
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studies based on constructivist assumptions or approaches that allow adding a new 
internal determinant to our list: ideas.  
 
Ideas: Constructivist studies argue that ‘ideas informing the CAP have not remained the 
same and that expectations of what the CAP should deliver have changed in the course 
of its development.’ (Lynggaard and Nedergaard 2009: 296) From this viewpoint, the 
rationale informing the CAP has moved from a dependent (state-assisted) agriculture 
paradigm towards multifunctional and competitive (market liberal) agriculture 
paradigms in a ‘cumulative paradigm change’ process (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2011: 
131). These studies have concentrated in pinpointing the evolution of the ideational 
structure prevailing at the time of each CAP reform so as to explain the underlying 
forces of political processes. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the notion of co-responsibility 
as a means of restoring the market balance was favoured by the Commission (Grant, 
2010). By the late 1990s, internal EU debate ‘referred to the “European Model of 
Agriculture”, reflecting agriculture’s “multifunctionality”’ (Ackrill et al, 2008: 404) 
(Cross-compliance and modulation are part of multifunctionality making CAP more 
acceptable to consumers and taxpayers. Since the 2008, significantly rising world prices 
have led to a revival of the discourse of food security.) The main research method has 
been to assess the constructivist determinant in terms of discursive developments. 
 
Some consider that the ideational structure evolution has been the result of changes 
internal to the EU (Burrell, 2009), others that they can be attributed to ideational change 
in the WTO (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2009). In any case, researchers recognise that 
the constructivist determinant is not a trigger for reform but a constraint on the direction 
of the reform. In the words of Lynggaard and Nedergaard (2009: 297): ‘Altogether, 
according to this perspective, policy developments are occurring against the background 
of an ideational context, which delimits available, efficient and legitimate policy 
choices from those that are not.’ Daugbjerg and Swinbank (2009: 312): ‘ideas underpin 
institutions which, in turn, give direction to policy makers when making policy by 
providing shared views on how to interpret policy problems and on how to rank policy 
concerns.’5 The process of fundamental reforms initiated with the MacSharry reforms in 
the early 1990s ‘has been accompanied by a reorientation of the CAP’s rationale from 
one of socially-legitimised income support to one recognising the multifunctionality of 
agriculture, placing more emphasis on public-good type benefits, e.g. environment 
protection.’ (Henning and Latacz-Lohmann 2004: 39).  
 
 
 
3.  A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS OF PAC REFORM 
DETERMINANTS 
 
Studies of CAP reform have concentrated in establishing whether each of these 
determinants have had an impact on CAP reform. The studies that try to establish links 
among these different determinants or to distinguish between different types of 
influence have so far been the exception rather than the rule.6  Nevertheless they are 
                                                 
5
 It should be mentioned that some analysts consider that ‘the rethoric of multifunctionality’ may just be 
‘the state-assisted paradigm dressed up in different clothes’  as most payments are still not directly related 
to the provision of public goods.  (Daugbjerg and Swinbank, 2011: 137) 
6
 Ackrill et al (2008) have tried to reconcile budget pressures with international pressures by arguing that 
both were generated by the price support system of the initial CAP. Lynggaard and Nedergaard (2009) 
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probably the next step in studying CAP reform because as Jensen et al (2009: 330-331) 
put it: ‘In total, it is hard to imagine that these internal and external issues are not 
correlated in some way. The causality, however, can differ across reforms.’ 
 
We believe further insights on the dynamics of CAP reform may be gained by focusing 
on the nature of the impact of the determinants of CAP reform. Taking advantage of the 
fact that there is literature on the role played by each of the six determinants in each of 
the CAP revisions, we have reinterpreted these findings in terms of their impact on 
timing, generosity and substance. To carry out this re-interpretation of the literature 
review, we have considered that a determinant has an impact on timing when without 
this factor the reform would not have happened. The determinant has an impact on 
substance when without this factor the reform would not have been the same in terms of 
instruments, that is, in how the CAP has changed its instruments. And the determinant 
has an impact on generosity when without this factor the reform would not have been 
the same in terms of the amount of financial support given to the farmers by any means.  
 
Table 1 highlights the results of this analysis for each of the CAP revisions. Table 3 ( at 
the end of the article) summarises the results from the viewpoint of the six determinants. 
Both tables show that the determinants role in terms of timing, substance and generosity 
is not always the same. Three of the determinants impact varies depending on the 
reform/revision we are considering. Budget pressures have always had an impact on 
generosity but only affected the substance of CAP reform in the 1980s and were not a 
timing determinant in 2003. International pressures have had an impact on substance 
since the 1990s but sometimes also a timing one. Even enlargement can be argued to 
have had timing, generosity or substance impact depending on the reform although this 
may be due to its clear connection with the budget pressures. Three determinants always 
have the same role: the impact of path dependency, ideas and the institutional setting 
has always been on substance.  
 
If now we look at the results from a viewpoint of the impact classification (see Table 4 
at the end of the article) and we take into account that only two of the revisions of CAP 
can be considered real reforms, a certain pattern appears. International pressure seems to 
be the necessary condition for real CAP reform to take place. Yet international pressure 
was also present in 1999 and 2008 without leading to a reform of CAP instruments. It 
seems therefore that international pressure is always taken into account when revising 
the CAP but it only becomes a timing determinant when there are active international 
negotiations. Our results also show that international pressure does not have an impact 
on the generosity of CAP support. In other words, international pressure does not 
determines what EU farmers are going to receive but have a big say on how they are 
going to receive it. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
have argued that there is a general link between the constructive determinant and the rational choice 
determinants. They sustain that (p 298) ‘in the medium to longer term, ideational change may give to 
changes in agents’ conception of costs and benefits of alternative policy choices and, in turn, alter agents’ 
conceived interests.’ For them ‘preferences (constructivism) + institutions (rational choice)= outcome’ (p 
300)). Lovec and Erjavec (2013) have recently tried to link the three ‘reform contexts’ –the world trade, 
the budget bargaining and the new policy issues (such as food safety, animal welfare, rural development 
and the environment)- through Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist approach. In particular, they 
consider that the underlying causality is the asymmetrical development of production factors and 
production relations, including the international production relations. 
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The budget pressure is always present although it was only able to affect the substance 
of the reform in the 1980s. Since then the budget has become an ever present constraint 
to the generosity of the CAP support. In fact, one may argue that the budget has been a 
timing determinant in almost all CAP revisions because each financial perspective 
revision has entailed a negotiation on how to limit the CAP budget. As the 2003 reform 
proves, nevertheless, changes in CAP instruments may happen even without impending 
budget negotiations. In other words, since the 1980s budget pressures have not been a 
sufficient condition for CAP reform but have always helped determine the amount of 
aid farmers were going to receive.  
 
The enlargement pressure, as expected, is much related with the budgetary pressure. 
The entry of new members with clear agricultural weight in a context of budget restraint 
can only lead to further budgetary constraints. It is interesting to note that the 2004 
enlargement may be having an ex-post impact on substance. This impact may, 
nevertheless, be very much related with path dependency as the ex-post enlargement 
impact may be the result of pre-enlargement decisions.  
 
The pressure of path dependency, ideas and the institutional setting is clearly focused on 
the substance of the policy. None may be considered a sufficient condition but all seem 
to play a role in the design of CAP instruments. Their role in substance seem to be 
subordinated to that of the international pressure since a real reform only takes place 
when there are international pressures and CAP instruments have to give an answer to 
those pressures. 
 
This analysis of the literature confirms that to understand CAP reform both external and 
internal factors must be taken into account. Our analysis, however, allow us to refine 
this conclusion. It seems that it is the external pressures that have determined the timing 
of the main reforms. International pressures would also have been crucial in explaining 
the substance of all reforms since the 1990s. Internal pressures, including the budget, 
would have been particularly important in explaining the generosity of the CAP support 
but subsidiary in terms of substance or timing.   
 
On the bases of this analysis, the economic crisis, by itself, can only be expected to have 
an impact in CAP generosity. The policy would have been reviewed in any case since a 
new financial perspective had to be negotiated for 2014-20 and the substance of the 
policy would only be changed in earnest (that is, change of its instruments) if there is 
enough international pressure.  Does the analysis of the 2013 CAP changes confirm this 
hypothesis?  
 
 
4. CAP 2013 DETERMINANTS  
 
 
IT IS NOT A REFORM: CAP 2013 cannot be considered a reform because it does not 
change the policy instruments. Post 2013 CAP will still be based on two Pillars: a first 
Pillar, fully EU funded, for market support and direct payments based on decoupling 
and cross-compliance and a second Pillar, co-financed by the Member States, for rural 
development. As Table 5 summarises, the changes agreed in 2013 suppose an 
adjustment of this policy main instruments.   
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Table 5. CAP 2013 changes in terms of policy instruments 
 
 
Market support Confirmation that milk quotas will disappear in 2015. Sugar 
quotas to be maintained until 2020. 
Other remaining measures of market support, including 
export subsidies, are to be maintained 
Direct payments Adjustments to the decoupled Single Payment Scheme so as 
to introduce an EU wide flat area payment by 2019 (new 
redistribution of payments among member states and 
among farmers) 
Definition of active farmer. 
Reinforced cross-compliance 
Coupled payments are still possible 
Rural development Objectives remain the same: climate change, environment 
and innovation (competitiveness). (Risk management) 
 
Sources: own elaboration on the bases of Regulations proposals (2011) and European 
Parliament decision (Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest 17(9), 13 March 2013). 
 
 
ROLE PLAYED BY EACH OF THE SIX DETERMINANTS 
 
International pressure: No impact. Although there has been a revival of Doha 
negotiations on agriculture, evidence indicates that CAP is already prepared to comply 
with third country demands regarding both internal support and export subsidies. The 
two remaining contention points: the green box and market access do not seem to have 
been taken into account.  
 
As to the green box, the 2013 changes increase the degree of cross-compliance and 
introduce an active farmer definition despite the fact that some analysts have pointed 
out that these changes may endanger the consideration of EU decoupled payments as 
part of the WTO green box. So far decoupled payments have not been denounced by the 
other WTO members as non being green box but that does not mean that they cannot be 
challenged in the future.  
 
Regarding market access, analysts agree that depending on which products are 
considered sensible, the need to reduce protection in front of imports may have an 
impact on the European agricultural sector. Again there is no mention of this particular 
possibility in CAP 2013. It may be that it is assumed that international prices of 
agricultural goods will remain high.  
 
Budget pressure: Impact on timing and on generosity. On timing: the need to agree on 
new EU Multiannual Financial Framework supposes a revision of all EU policies. 
Generosity: the reduction of CAP budget has not been radical. One may even argue that 
the reduction has been in line with previous tendency. Nevertheless, there has been a 
reduction so that the flat area payment proposed by the Commission will have to be 
adjusted accordingly. The latest figures tell us that ‘sustainable growth’ expenditure will 
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diminish in relative terms: from 0.45% GNI in 2007-13 to 0.39% GNI in 2014-20. In 
absolute terms the expenditure for this Heading will remain constant in real terms but 
market related expenditure and direct payments will diminish: from 293 105 to 277 851 
million Euros (although this reduction has to be qualified by the creation of emergency 
aid reserves).  
 
Enlargement: No impact. The entry of Croatia is not expected to have a noticeable 
impact on the agricultural sector structure and Turkey is not expected to become a 
member in the next seven years despite the renewal of negotiations.7 
 
Path dependency:  Impact on substance. It may be argued that most of the 2013 
changes are an attempt to deal with the equity problems created by previous decisions 
on how to deal with enlargement and with the CAP transformation.  Previous decisions 
would have created new equity problems between farmers from different Member 
States.  
 
Institutional Setting: Impact on substance. The European Parliament has a new role 
both in budget and CAP decisions that has already led to changes to the European 
Council agreement. A clear prove of the EP enrolment is the fact that it has voted to 
maintain export subsidies as policy instrument, to water down cross-compliance 
requirements and to re-couple some payments to production. The new CAP Regulations 
were published in the Official Journal of the EU in December 2013 (OJ L347, 
20.12.2013).   
 
Ideas: Impact on substance. There has been a shift in the effort to give legitimacy to the 
CAP. The concept of multifunctionality is still present and linked to climate change and 
environment but, in a context of high international food prices, food security has 
reappeared as a valid argument to justify farmer support. What is new is that food 
security is advocated from the international viewpoint: To secure food supply at 
international level it is necessary to ensure agricultural production in the EU.  Last but 
not least, CAP 2013 changes are justified on the bases of equity.  
 
On the bases of this analysis, our hypothesis is confirmed. Despite the fact that all 
internal determinants have been present, CAP 2013 cannot be considered a reform. 
Again it seems that international pressure is needed for instrumental change to occur. 
The economic crisis has not made the budget pressure strong enough to affect the 
substance of the policy. Neither can the crisis explain the timing of the revision: CAP 
2013 was called for by the need to review EU policies in the context of the multiannual 
financial perspectives negotiations.  
 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
                                                 
7
 We consider that any ex-post effect of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements must now be considered part of 
the path dependency determinant because CAP 2013 addresses the equity problems previous enlargement 
agreements have created rather than how to deal with the enlargements per se.  
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CAP 2013 has not been the result of the economic crisis and cannot even be considered 
a reform. The economic crisis may have had an impact on the generosity of CAP 
support but not on the timing or substance of the changes.  
 
Since the 1990s CAP reforms have been based on changes in its instruments rather than 
on its objectives and have been triggered by international rather than internal pressure. 
Since most of EU support may now be considered part of the WTO green box, 
international pressure may well be in the descent. Nevertheless, new CAP reforms may 
still be on the making as internal pressures may gather force. Indeed, some analysts 
seem to believe that budgetary pressures may one day lead towards the re-
nationalization of the CAP and others that the need to legitimise the CAP may one day 
lead to a change of its objectives in the Treaty. In any case, the present economic crisis 
has not been able to provoke such a reaction. (Does this reflect the lack of political force 
of Great Britain which in 2005 had been able to get a promise for a two step revision of 
the CAP?)  
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 Table 1. CAP revisions 
 
 
 
THE 1980S  
Market support CAP: policy characterized by indirect 
support to farmers provided by a floor for 
domestic prices, border protection and 
export subsidies. All financed by the 
Community budget. 
1980s  Price revisions and curbs on 
production (Guarantee thresholds (1982), 
milk quotas (1984), maximum guaranteed 
quantities (1987)) with co-responsibility 
levies.  
 
Rural development 1970s Mansholt Plan: limited set of 
structural measures co-financed by 
Member States 
 
1992 MACSHARRY REFORM  
Market support Reduction in prices 
Direct payments Partial shift from indirect or price support 
to compensatory direct payments (coupled 
to type of crops grown and livestock 
kept). 
Rural development New accompanying measures co-financed 
by Member states (agri-environmental 
programme, new subsidies for 
afforestation of agricultural land and early 
retirement scheme for farmers) 
1999 AGENDA 2000  
Market support Further price reduction 
Direct payments Further shift from indirect to direct 
payments (in 2002 the Commission 
recognised that the compensatory 
character had disappear and that the term 
‘direct aid’ had replaced ‘compensation 
payment’ –Swinbank and Tranter, 2004, 
preface) and introduction of optional cross 
compliance (Member states decided on 
whether farmers were obliged to respect 
specified environmental, animal health 
and food safety standards to receive full 
payment of direct aid) 
 
Rural development Creation II Pilar: consolidation of  green 
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direct payments and of co-financing  
Introduction of voluntary modulation 
 
 
2003 FISCHLER REFORM  
Market support Reduction of prices  
Direct payments Reduction of coupled direct payments 
Decoupled direct payments Partial decoupling of farm aid from type 
of commodity and from production. From 
the area and headage payments into a flat 
rate decoupled Single Payment Scheme 
based on previous (2000-2002) direct 
payment levels. Member states were 
allowed to apply the scheme on a 
regionalised basis or in a farm-based 
mode.  
 
For New Member States: simplified 
version of Single Farm Payment to be 
phased in until 2013 (starting at 25% of 
the EU-15 rate in 2004)  
 
Cross-compliance is reinforced and 
becomes compulsory.  
Rural development Introduction of compulsory modulation 
(5%) and of member state discretion in 
using the modulation funds.. 
2008 HEALTH CHECK  
Market support Reduction  
Direct payments Reduction 
Decoupled direct payments Almost complete decoupling from 
production 
Direct payments are still tied to land, land 
must be kept in good agricultural 
condition (cross-compliance) and 
recipients must be farmers. 
 
Rural development Funds from increased compulsory 
modulation (10%) to be used to address 
new challenges: climate change, 
renewable energies, water management 
and biodiversity, at the discretion of each 
member states 
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Table 3. The CAP reform determinants in terms of timing, generosity and substance 
 
  1980s 1992 1999 2003 2008 
Budget 
Timing, generosity, 
substance timing, generosity timing, generosity generosity timing, generosity 
Enlargement generosity generosity timing, generosity 
Generosity, 
substance 
generosity, 
substance 
Path dependency substance substance substance substance substance 
Ideas substance substance substance substance substance 
Institutional setting substance substance substance substance substance 
International 
pressure not relevant timing, substance substance 
timing, 
substance substance 
 
 
Table 4. CAP reforms from the viewpoint of timing, generosity and substance 
 
 1980s 1992 1999 2003 2008 
Timing Budget Budget, 
International 
pressure 
Budget, enlargement International 
pressure 
Budget 
Generosity Budget, enlargement Budget, enlargement Budget, enlargement Budget, enlargement Budget, enlargement 
Substance Budget, path 
dependency, ideas, 
institutional setting 
International 
pressure, path 
dependency, ideas, 
institutional setting 
International 
pressure, path 
dependency, ideas, 
institutional setting 
International 
pressure, path 
dependency, ideas, 
institutional setting, 
enlargement 
International 
pressure, path 
dependency, ideas, 
institutional setting, 
enlargement 
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